Late last month, dozens of trade associations representing shippers, logistics firms, port operators, chambers of commerce, and others wrote to Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson urging a rethinking of the Safe Port Act of 2006. Implementation of the law, which requires all cargo containers entering the United States to be scanned for contraband and security threats, is already well beyond its initial implementation date, delayed – as might have been expected – by both financial and technological constraints.

Passed in the wake of the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks, the act no doubt falls into the large “seemed like a good idea at the time” category of responses to terrorism. But however well-intentioned, the law is indeed too impractical to implement as written. What’s more, there are likely more and greater threats today than someone slipping a “dirty” bomb into a 20-foot container for a long ocean voyage to the United States.

The ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, which received 37 percent of all U.S. cargo imports in the first quarter, are among the most vital commercial hubs in the nation. They are also highly vulnerable.

As recent events have shown, it takes far less than a dirty bomb to wreak terror and havoc at a transit hub.

Add to that the variety of agencies that bear responsibility for security at the ports: the Los Angeles Port Police, the Los Angeles and Long Beach police departments, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Department of Homeland Security, and the California Highway Patrol. Terminal operators in some cases have their own security personnel.

While such coverage might seem to present multiple layers of security, they also create multiple layers of bureaucracy and the risk of jurisdictional infighting. Focusing security efforts on assuring coordination, training, and open communication among agencies will go far further than the cost and disruption to cargo flow that is inevitable under the Safe Port Act.